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April 25, 2022
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090
File No. S7-10-22
Proposal on Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors
The enthusiasm of many Commissioners and Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “SEC”) to participate in the global debate about climate change is understandable. After all,
protecting the earth’s sustainability is perhaps the most compelling issue of our time. It’s an issue
all must take seriously and everyone must do their part. But each of us, and particularly
governmental authorities, must always act in accordance with law and fairness.
The undersigned, a group of professors of law and finance, are concerned that the SEC’s
recent proposal to impose extensive mandatory climate-related disclosure rules on public
companies (the “Proposal”) exceeds the SEC’s authority. In addition, rather than provide “investor
protection,” the Proposal seems to be heavily influenced by a small but powerful cohort of
institutional investors, mostly index funds and asset managers, promoting climate consciousness
as part of their business models.
The framework of this letter traces the potential sources of the SEC’s authority, which are
a function of federal statutes and other federal laws. The statutes that created the SEC in the 1930s
authorize the SEC to promulgate disclosure regulations that are “necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”1 Amendments to those statutes in the late 1990s
instructed the SEC to report on whether a proposed regulation will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.2

1
2

Securities Act Sections 7, 10, 19(a); Exchange Act, Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a).

Securities Act §2(b); Exchange Act § 23(a)(2); see American Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d
166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

The following analysis raises concerns that the Proposal is neither necessary nor
appropriate for either investor protection or the public interest and will not promote other statutory
goals. The SEC would do better to withdraw the Proposal and revisit its approach to this subject.
The three parts of this letter address each statutory issue in turn, as follows:
I. “Investor Demand” versus “Investor Protection”
A. Investor Varieties: Diverse Institutions and Individuals
B. Climate Shareholder Proposals: Few Are Made, Most Lose, Many Are Political
C. The Ample Supply of Climate Disclosure
D. Correlation of Climate Practices with Economic Performance Is Not Causation
II. Authority of Others and the “Public Interest”
A. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Statutory Jurisdiction
B. State Corporate Law Prerogatives on Purposes, Powers and Business Judgments
C. Risk of Unconstitutional Compelled Political Speech
III. Other Statutory Considerations
A. Certain High Costs versus Highly Speculative Benefits
B. Unduly Benefiting ESG Investors Impairs Investment Industry Competition
C. Compliance Burdens Discourage Public Company Registrations
Conclusion
Appendix: Analysis of the Proposal’s Citation Patterns
I. “Investor Demand” versus “Investor Protection”
The SEC and its proponents rely heavily on “investor demand” as a way to invoke SEC
authority based on investor protection. When a substantial portion of investors across all segments
of the investment industry and across the investing public concur in the appropriateness and/or
necessity of SEC intervention, “investor demand” is a credible rationale for SEC regulation.
Prominent examples are accounting reforms that the SEC undertook pursuant to the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 as well as the specific targeted disclosure requirements it adopted concerning
“Year 2000 issues” arising from systemic risk of widespread software malfunctions when the
calendar reached January 1, 2000.
However, on divisive political topics of uncertain and inchoate corporate significance, like
climate change, such a consensus is elusive. In this context, people’s views differ sharply and
investors have varied views on issues associated with the earth’s climate, including whether and
how to incorporate the concept into their investment processes. Many investors have long done so
implicitly, some have recently begun doing so with great fanfare, and others have no plans to do
so. Therefore, asserting “investor demand” from the most vocal segment of the investment
industry provides a dubious basis for the SEC to claim exercise of its statutory authority in the
name of “investor protection.”
A. Investor Varieties: Diverse Institutions and Individuals
The investors demanding climate-related information are almost exclusively institutional
asset managers who are managing other people’s money, not their own. This raises the obvious
question whether their advocacy is prompted by concern for their beneficiaries’ returns or their
2

own profitability. Two of the SEC’s current major rulemaking proposals relating to private fund
advisors each contain dozens of references to potential conflicts of interest between private
advisors and their sophisticated clients.3 Yet this Proposal makes not a single reference to potential
conflicts of interest between retail asset managers and their less-sophisticated clients, instead
taking it as given that what is good for the asset manager is good for the beneficiary.
To determine whether adopting the Proposal will protect investors, the SEC must explicitly
consider the conflicts that arise between large asset managers and their beneficiaries and whether
climate disclosure mandate will exacerbate them.4 There is no indication that the SEC has
attempted to assess, much less quantify, the potential losses to individual investors from selfinterested voting or engagement by the asset managers to whom 160 million Americans entrust
their savings. That fact alone is a fatal flaw of the Proposal.
1. The Most Vocal Institutions.
The Proposal refers to “investor demand” 54 times, with copious citations tied to one
segment of the investment industry.5 The Proposal devotes five pages to introduce what it calls
“growing investor demand,” mainly by listing six consortia of large institutions along with their
reported assets under management.6 The list starts with three groups of large institutions that have
signed the United Nations’ policy advocacy documents urging countries to reduce climate risks.
The United Nations is neither a business nor an investor and lacks any relevant expertise
in either domain. It is a political institution engaged in coordinating international policies on a
variety of contentious topics, including as an incubator of the concept of ESG and climate
management. The other three groups are avowed climate activists, reflected in their chosen
organizational names: Net Zero Asset Managers Initiative, Climate Action 100+ and Glasgow
Financial Alliance for Net Zero.
The Proposal does not further identify these investors nor indicate the portion of the
reported assets invested in SEC registrants as compared to other investments in the world. Aside
from obvious member overlap in the first two referenced initiatives, the Proposal does not disclose
overlaps in these numbers, except a vague general acknowledgement that “There is some overlap
in the signatories to the listed initiatives.”7
Nor does the Proposal disclose the proportion of the listed assets under management
invested in SEC registrants that are actively managed versus passively managed. It does not
delineate other important matters of investment style, particularly whether these investors follow
traditional fundamental valuation analysis, conventional diversification based on modern portfolio
3

SEC, Release No. IA-5950; File No. S7-01-22, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ia-5950.pdf and
SEC, Release Nos. IA-5955; File No. S7-03-22, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/ia-5955.pdf.
4

See Paul G. Mahoney & Julia D. Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional
Investors and ESG, 2021 Columbia Business Law Review 840.
5

See Appendix hereto for an analysis of the citation patterns in the Proposal.
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Proposal, pages 25-29 (repeated at pages 332-333).

7

Proposal, footnote 56.

3

theory, or fashionable indexing based on rankings of companies according to their climate-related
practices. It does not delineate which of these investors invest for their own account or on behalf
of clients or the breakdown of such clients between institutions or individuals.
Such investor demographics and styles are essential predicates to determining whether
there is a need for rulemaking along the lines stated in the Proposal.8 Such an understanding of
which institutions are expressing such demand is particularly important for SEC disclosure
regulations because these investor types demand different kinds of information and utilize it
differently.9 For instance, traditional index funds do not select stocks by parsing SEC disclosure
but rather formulaically buy and sell based on fluctuations in an index, without regard to such
disclosure.10 Traditional stock pickers scrutinize such information carefully to ascertain business
value, economic advantages, and investment trajectory.11
BlackRock, State Street, and other large index fund providers face a challenging
competitive environment. Fees for index funds have been driven nearly to zero. Profitability
therefore depends on spreading the managers’ fixed costs over a larger pool of managed assets. In
attempting to attract investment inflows, large index funds compete against one another and with
active managers. The latter have a built-in advantage in attracting socially conscious investors
because they can offer non-indexed products specifically catering to ESG-focused investors.
For the manager of an index fund that must invest in all or substantially all companies in
the index, public statements that climate is a top priority across the entire portfolio can be an
important marketing tool in the competition with one another and with active managers. A recent
academic article makes the point cogently:
[I]ndex funds are locked in a fierce contest to win the soon-to-accumulate assets of
the millennial generation, who place a significant premium on social issues in their
economic lives. With fee competition exhausted and returns irrelevant for index
investors, signaling a commitment to social issues is one of the few dimensions on
which index funds can differentiate themselves and avoid commoditization.12
While index funds may be interested in using climate-friendly voting and engagement as a
marketing device, they cannot afford to incur substantial new costs to do so. A mandatory climate
disclosure regime requiring publicly traded companies to bear the cost of producing and
See SEC Office of Inspector General, Follow-Up Review of Cost-Benefit Analyses in Selected SEC
Dodd-Frank Act Rulemakings, Report No. 499 (Jan. 27, 2012) (“OIG Report No. 499”) at 31-36.

8

9

E.g., Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence
from a Global Survey, 74 Financial Analysts Journal 87 (2018).
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See John C. Bogle, The Little Book of Common Sense Investing: The Only Way to Guarantee Your Fair
Share of Stock Market Returns (2017); Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (12th ed.
2019).

11

See Benjamin Graham & Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: The Definitive Book on Value Investing
(rev. ed. 2009); Warren E. Buffett & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons
for Corporate America (5th ed. 2019).

12

Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism
and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 USC Law Review 1243, 1244 (2020).
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standardizing the climate-related information would save such funds costs while advancing their
agendas. The Proposal fails to assess how its rules will affect different segments of the investment
industry differently or alternative approaches that would not favor some sectors at the expense of
others.13
Another subgroup of investors the Proposal unfairly favors are those who, unlike traditional
investors, are not focused on economic gain from their investments. For instance, the boards of
public employee pension funds, such as CalPERS, include government appointees and elected
officials, all of whom respond to politics, including the politics of climate change.14 Less overtly,
the Proposal benefits fund managers promoting virtues other than investor protection, such as the
pension funds of the AFL-CIO, which advocate shareholder proposals pushing a labor agenda.15
Another powerful force in certain segments of the investment industry are proxy advisors,
such as Institutional Investor Services (ISS). These organizations have invested heavily in
nonfinancial products such as climate ratings. For instance, ISS’s ESG ratings unit assigns
sustainability ratings to companies. Then ISS’s Corporate Solutions unit turns around and sells a
separate set of services to those companies to improve their ratings.16 Pushing companies to
disclose more and more of the information contemplated by the Proposal, and to reset behavioral
baselines around such services, may well be good for ISS’s business. But the SEC’s assessment
of “investor demand” should adjust for these powerful forces.
2. The Unsung: Individual Investors.
The investor group most in need of the SEC’s “protection” are not the multi-trillion-dollar
funds the Proposal repeatedly emphasizes, but the 160 million individual American investors who
cannot fend for themselves. Yet, inexplicably, while the Proposal repeatedly cites the interests of
such powerful institutions, it mentions individual investors only once in 508 pages. This occurs
13

See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

14

See David Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon (2018).

15

See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence
from Proxy Voting, 25 Review of Financial Studies 187 (2012).

16

ISS offers an “ESG Corporate Rating.” It solicits business from companies in email campaigns. These
announce that ISS plans to assign a rating to the solicited company, inviting management to participate.
The email describes the process, stressing that it gives “prime status” to companies ISS dubs “sustainability
leaders.” A footnote explains that ISS ESG is the corporate arm selling to ISS’s investor clients and that its
sister subsidiary, ISS Corporate Solutions (ICS), sells to corporate issuer clients to enable them to improve
their practices and ratings. The footnote continues:
To manage any potential conflict relating to ICS, ISS has implemented a firewall designed to
prevent information flows regarding the identity of ICS clients (or potential clients). Pursuant
to ISS’ “firewall” policies, ISS personnel are prohibited from being made aware of the identity
of corporate issuers that are clients (or prospective clients) of ICS. The intent of this firewall is to
avoid the appearance or possibility that ISS research regarding an issuer could be affected by the
knowledge that the issuer is a client of ICS. To the extent that your company has purchased any
products or services from ICS, we ask that you do not disclose to ISS or its employees, either
directly or implicitly, that you are a client or potential client of ICS. (Italics in the original.)
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when it says that if institutional analysts digest the detailed climate disclosure using certain
advanced software:
this would likely benefit retail investors, who have generally been observed to rely
on analysts’ interpretation of financial disclosures rather than directly analyzing
those disclosures themselves.
The SEC should not give America’s individual investors such short shrift. To the contrary,
the SEC should directly attempt to gauge the level of investor demand among individuals for the
controversial and expensive disclosures the Proposal envisions. Academic research raises doubt.
For instance, when scholars explicitly distinguish institutional from investor “demand,” they find
that “ESG disclosures are irrelevant to retail investors’ portfolio allocation decisions.”17
Another recent survey of individual investors by FINRA and the University of Chicago
indicates that most do not share the institutional enthusiasm for “ESG investing,” many are
unfamiliar with it, and one-fourth think the acronym stands for “earnings stock growth.”18
The SEC would also do well to ask the institutions “demanding” such information whether
they have polled their individual clients, the ultimate investors, to determine whether they agree
on the desirability or need for such information. That would provide a more meaningful measure
of “investor demand” than the Proposal presents, as well as help assure that such institutions are
meeting their fiduciary duties when managing assets for others.19 The empirical evidence raises
doubts about whether institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, are doing so.20
The Proposal makes much of the assertion that large institutional money managers say that
climate policy is the number one thing they like to discuss with companies during their
engagements with them.21 In doing so, the Proposal overlooks two critical features of such
shareholder engagement.
First, the practice of shareholder engagement is relatively new and is evolving.22 At
present, most institutional investors continue to prioritize engagement with those companies and
17

See Austin Moss, James Naughton & Clare Wang, The Irrelevance of ESG Disclosure to Retail Investors:
Evidence from Robinhood (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3604847.
18

See Lauren Foster, Investors Know Little About ESG, a New Study Finds, Barron’s (April 12, 2022),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/esg-meaning-sustainable-investing-study-51649719876 (citing survey of
1,128 individual investors indicating that only 9% say they have ESG-related investments).
19

See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The
Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stanford Law Review 381 (2020).

20

See Jean-Pierre Aubry, Anqi Chen, Patrick Hubbard & Alicia H. Munnell, ESG Investing and Public
Pensions: An Update, Boston College Center for Retirement Research (2020) (“The evidence suggests,
however, that social investing: 1) yields lower returns; and 2) is not effective at achieving social goals.
Hence, any form of social investing is not appropriate for public pension funds.”) (emphasis added).
21

Proposal, pages 330-331 (citing survey of 42 large institutions managing $29 trillion in assets indicating
that climate risk is “the number one investor engagement priority” or the “leading issue driving their
engagement with companies”).

22

See
Shareholder
Engagement:
An
Evolving
Landscape,
Drexel
https://www.lebow.drexel.edu/news/shareholder-engagement-evolving-landscape.
6
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on those topics of special interest for particular reasons, not recurring matters of business life. If
they are prioritizing climate, that may not reflect pervasive investor demand as much as it does
specific issues at certain companies or specific priorities for certain investors and their business
models.
Second, the SEC overlooks the fact that institutional investors may have the power and
influence to get engagement meetings with companies, but individual investors never do.
Individual investors must be content with annual shareholder meetings and periodic investor
Q&As. To elevate the priorities and practices of such powerful elite institutions over those of
individual shareholders is perverse for an agency whose historical raison-d’etre and current
website emphasize protecting individual investors.23
B. Climate Shareholder Proposals: Few Are Made, Most Lose, Many Are Political
The SEC and other proponents arguing investor demand as the force behind the Proposal
cite shareholder proposal proliferation as evidence.24 In theory, this is a potentially fruitful place
to look for evidence about investor protection issues. The shareholder proposal process is a
recognized method through which shareholders register their voice. One or more shareholders or
nominal shareholders submit proposals for votes at annual meetings, using SEC proxy rule 14a-8.
The board weighs in. Shareholders vote. The board decides what to do, in accordance with
longstanding state corporation law.
The SEC and proponents say ecological stewardship by corporate directors is important to
investors by citing the rising number of shareholder proposals on the topic and “increasing”
shareholder votes favoring them. They do not point out, however, that few such proposals are
made, being limited to a minority of public companies; most lose; and many are made not by
traditional investors but by political activists taking advantage of the shareholder proposal process.
Consider data compiled by law firm Gibson Dunn over the proxy years, 2020 and 2021.25
Across some 12,000 SEC companies, 720 and 802 shareholder proposals were received,
respectively in those two years. The greatest percentage concerned governance topics (40% and
36% of the total each year) while few addressed climate change (8% and 14%). The lion’s share
of climate change proposals were filed by climate activist “As You Sow Foundation.” While quite
a few governance proposals won supermajority support (in excess of 80%), few climate proposals
even won a simple majority (4 in 2020, 11 in 2021). Such data indicates that “investor demand”
for climate information is far less than the Proposal would lead one to believe.
In the minority of cases where a proposal carries by a majority of votes, the victories are
so unusual that the press tends to present them in vivid terms.26 Such spotlights lead observers to

23

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, SEC’s Climate Change Proposal Gives Main Street Investors No Voice:
Here’s How to Make Yourself Heard, MarketWatch (April 9, 2022).

24

Proposal, page 334 and footnote 803.

25

See Gibson Dunn, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2020 Proxy Season (August 2020);
See Gibson Dunn, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2021 Proxy Season (August 2021).

26

E.g., Fight for the Soul—and the Future—of ExxonMobil, Washington Post (May 22, 2021); see also
Majority Support for E&S Proposals Almost Doubles in US, Corporate Secretary (October 28, 2021)
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believe that the trends favoring such proposals are stronger than they are. In fact, the important
victories on climate matters have tended to congregate in the companies producing the greatest
emissions and facing corresponding risks, particularly energy companies. And even the headline
grabbing proxy contest vote at ExxonMobil carried by only 62% and emissions disclosure votes
were approved by relatively low margins at ConocoPhillips (by 59.3%) and Chevron (60.7%).
From another point of view, moreover, the number of climate-related shareholder proposals
is actually a poor measure of investor protection. Late last year, the SEC Staff announced a new
approach to its review of no-action requests to exclude shareholder proposals under Rule 14a8(i)(7).27 The Staff indicated that it will not permit exclusions of proposals just because they aren’t
related to a company’s business or finances but rather will “focus on [their] social policy
significance.” The Staff thus acknowledges that many climate-related proposals are not related to
a company’s business or financial interests.
The SEC and the Proposal are therefore at war with themselves: the SEC cannot
simultaneously prohibit public companies from excluding shareholder proposals that “transcend
ordinary business” yet portray the proliferation of such proposals as evidence of the “business
case” for climate-friendly practices. If the SEC intends to draw a link between the number of
climate-related shareholder proposals and the protection of investors, it must first study whether
such proposals reflect business and financial interests shared broadly across all investors or only
the political and social policy preferences held by only a subset.
As a preview of what such a study might show, the most recent Proxy Preview Report
identifies 65 resolutions in the 2022 proxy season requiring the adoption of greenhouse gas
emissions goals.28 A majority of those were submitted by organizations whose websites
unambiguously indicate that their objective is to pursue the organizations’ social values, not
investment returns.
In short, the evidence from shareholder proposal practices does not support the case that
“investor demand” justifies the SEC’s invocation of the SEC’s “investor protection” authority to
pass the Proposal. More likely, the evidence suggests that shareholders and managers are working
hard together to determine which companies ought to disclose what additional information, not
that all companies must now produce the same standardized data. Indeed, given that corporations
were designed and operate as economic rather than political institutions, the system is handling
the intervention of political activism tolerably well. Injecting more politics into corporate life risks
exceeding this capability.
C. The Ample Supply of Climate Disclosure
As of 2021, nearly half of all SEC registrants adhere to one of the leading international
reporting authority’s framework for disclosing risks and impacts of climate change.29 Such
(despite the headline, reporting that 23 of 36 environmental proposals failed to attract a majority of the
votes and average support was 39%).
27

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Legal Bulletin No.
14L (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14l-shareholder-proposals.

28

Proxy Preview 2022, https://www.proxypreview.org.

29

See Sankalp Gaur et al., TCFD-Aligned Reporting by Major U.S. and European Corporations, Moody’s
Analytics
(February
2022),
8

adherence to private frameworks provides useful information to shareholders who digest this
information in their investment process. The homogenized, standardized, unified data the SEC
proposes may please a powerful vocal cohort of asset managers or index funds and meet their
demands for a single standard for comparative purposes. But they would be paid for by individuals
and other shareholders who most need the SEC’s protection, whether or not they desire such
information.
Revealingly, industry sectors leading in climate disclosure are among the most carbonintensive sectors: energy and building materials.30 Sectors with lower disclosure are industries like
technology and telecommunications, which face limited climate-related risks. Such trends show
that the system is working towards the intended effect of the SEC’s 2010 interpretive guidance,
which instructed firms to disclose material risks specific to their business from climate change.31
Imposing a standardized framework may produce more raw data, but it will do little to get
shareholders additional information they utilize for investment decisions.32
By the same token, there is evidence that the market already has the information needed to
enable individual investors to continue to invest in traditional actively-managed or index funds or
migrate to the fashionable funds promoted as prioritizing climate-consciousness or other social
causes. For instance, the Proposal cites data indicating that in the past few years,33 individual
investors have allocated a far larger portion of net investment dollars to funds boasting social or
political priorities compared to those offering traditional investments.
But while the Proposal presents the allocation of investment dollars to social and political
funds as evidence supporting the case for mandating information, an equally plausible
interpretation is that investors have the information they need to make such choices. Certainly, if
the funds have sufficient information to market their financial products as environmentally
conscious, for instance, they must have enough useful information to support the assertion.34 If
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/articles/pa/2022/tcfd_aligned_reporting_by_major_us_and_european_
corporations.
30

Id.

31

SEC, Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change. (2010).

32

Increasing the supply of information to satisfy the demand of one distinctive cohort may be myopic even
from the viewpoint of proponents. For instance, the proposed regime may instead induce a false sense of
complacency, do more to mitigate widespread social anxieties than actually mitigate climate change. See
Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification 138-147 (1997). Such regulation may even
create its own pathologies such as collection, reporting, control and auditing practices “oriented towards
the production of comforting labels.” Id.; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of
Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 267 (2004).
33

Proposal, footnote 804 (since 2019, $473 billion versus $103 billion).

34

A different interpretation of the data than the SEC offers is also possible: that such high flows to the
fashionable funds reflects the faddish appeal of this style of investing compared to stodgy old fundamental
value investing. See Scientific Beta, “Honey, I Shrunk the ESG Alpha”: Risk-Adjusting ESG Portfolio
Returns (April 2021) (“Recent strong performance of ESG strategies can be linked to an increase in investor
attention.”), https://cdn.ihsmarkit.com/www/pdf/0521/Honey-I-Shrunk-the-ESG-Alpha.pdf.

Yet another explanation, at least in the case of BlackRock clients, is that BlackRock has simply
been redirecting client funds into ESG funds whether or not the clients are aware of this or request it. See
9

they did not, the SEC should investigate such funds for compliance with applicable investor
protection laws. At the very least, the SEC must consider reasonable alternatives to the Proposal
that address the existing supply of climate-related information.35
Moreover, the Proposal does not explain why climate risk information warrants compelled
disclosure, rather than rely on voluntary disclosure, compared to information about all the other
risks a company faces. After all, companies must manage many risks that government could in
principle require specific disclosure on. With that disclosure, investors have more information,
which, in theory, should lead to better decision making. If there were no costs, government could
require disclosure of all of them.
But there are costs, and so a line must be drawn. The SEC’s original disclosure regime
focused on an audited set of financial statements that investors would find useful. Related
accounting rules, ultimately generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), provided the
anchor. Expected future events, to be disclosed, had to pose a material risk on ensuing financial
statements. Most SEC disclosure rules remain anchored in such principles.36
The Proposal, however, is not anchored to any such principles. It is unmoored and does not
offer any limiting principle to what the SEC can compel companies and their managers to declare.
Its potential costs are therefore unlimited. The SEC must articulate a reasoned—non-arbitrary and
non-capricious37—basis to distinguish climate change not only from financial reporting but also
from the myriad other risks businesses face, such as war, pandemic, monetary policy or social and
political concerns such as transacting with companies in China or Russia.
Since disclosure is costly to companies, requiring disclosure must also confer benefits
greater than their costs on those companies and their investors. Presumably this benefit is directly
tied to investors being able to use the information that is disclosed. But consider two facts: (1)
numerous climate models exist and none of them agree with each other and (2) take any climate
model and feed in the conditions of the past, and they are unable to predict the present.38 In a
setting so beset with inherent imprecision, it is most challenging to see how investors will benefit
from such disclosure.
A related issue is the definition of “climate risk.” Climate evolves over decades and
centuries. A report by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision highlights the practical
difficulties and inherent unreliability of calculating climate risk information:
the range of impact uncertainties, time horizon inconsistencies, and limitations in
the availability of historical data on the relationship of climate to traditional
Cam Simpson & Saijel Kishan, How BlackRock Made ESG the Hottest Ticket on Wall Street, Bloomberg
(December 31, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-31/how-blackrock-s-invisiblehand-helped-make-esg-a-hot-ticket.
35

Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144-5 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

36

E.g., Items 101, 103, 105, 303, and 503(c) of Regulation S-K.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150
(D.C. Cir. 2011).

37

38

See Steven E. Koonin, Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn't, and Why It Matters
(2021).
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financial risks, in addition to a limited ability of the past to act as a guide for future
developments, render climate risk measurement complex and its outputs less
reliable as risk estimators.39
How will SEC reporting companies declare risk exposure to such long-term change? Even
if it were feasible to do so, despite the limits of climate models, how will companies characterize
the risk itself? To calculate exposure, they would need, at the very least, a distribution of the risk.
Where will that come from?
On the other hand, the risk could be that companies are exposed in the shorter term to
changing attitudes to products thought to harm the environment. Clearly that will affect businesses
and will expose them to risks. But how is that different from any risk firms face with changing
preferences? It would be unprecedented for the SEC to mandate disclosure modeling the risks of
shifting consumer preferences.
At a minimum, the SEC should specify what benefits investors will derive from the
disclosure contemplated by the Proposal. Otherwise, without such a foundation, the government
may simply cite “investor demand” to exert control over private companies in ways that constrain
other investors’ choices, returns and protection.
D. Correlation of Climate Practices with Economic Performance Is Not Causation
Proponents say that investors increasingly use climate information in their investment
processes, that companies that fail to provide this information deprive investors of this capability,
and that the SEC is therefore authorized to compel the creation and disclosure of such information
as a matter of investor protection. They say investors take such an approach to evaluate the longterm viability of a company’s business model, its adaptability to potential future regulation, and
its susceptibility to reputational harm. Many say that investors perceive a connection between a
company’s climate practices and its economic performance. Some acknowledge that the goal is to
compel companies to incorporate climate matters into operational decision making.
To take these points in reverse order, it would be beyond the SEC’s authority to compel
the creation and disclosure of any information for the purpose of inducing companies to modify
their operational decision making in any way. That is the province of state corporation law, as Part
II of this letter will explore further, not within the SEC’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the SEC has never
questioned the basic decision of the Congress that, insofar as investing is concerned, the primary
interest of investors is economic.40 Departures from this principle would require explicit
Congressional directive.41
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Climate-Related Financial Risks—Measurement
Methodologies (April 2021) p. 17 https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d518.pdf.

39

40

See Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5569 (February 11, 1975) & Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975):
The SEC’s experience over the years in proposing and framing disclosure requirements
has not led it to question the basic decision of the Congress that, insofar as investing is
concerned, the primary interest of investors is economic. After all, the principal, if not the
only, reason why people invest their money in securities is to obtain a return.
41

National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Second, despite its repeated invocation, the perception of a causal link between ideal
climate conservation and superior economic returns is fallacious.42 There is no such causal
evidence. Abundant empirical research has been conducted to test for aspects of the relationship
between climate practices and economic performance.
For example, researchers have found a variety of relationships, some positive,43 some nonnegative,44 some negative.45 Several attribute most of any relationship to the disproportionate
presence of low-carbon high-performing technology stocks in many outperforming portfolios.46
Yet others raise serious questions about the existence of any relationship whatsoever.
In summary, despite tremendous research efforts, no substantial evidence exists to suggest
any causation between climate practice and superior economic performance.47
It is insufficient to counter, as some do, that compelling the production and presentation of
such information is lawful because it will enable researchers to test whether sustainability practices
really do cause superior economic performance. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

42

See Sanjai Bhagat, An Inconvenient Truth About ESG Investing, Harvard Business Review (March 31,
2022), https://hbr.org/2022/03/an-inconvenient-truth-about-esg-investing.

E.g., Ramakrishnan Ramanathan, Understanding Complexity: The Curvilinear Relationship Between
Environmental Performance and Firm Performance, Journal of Business Ethics (Feb. 26, 2016); Soh Young
In, et al., Is 'Being Green' Rewarded in the Market?: An Empirical Investigation of Decarbonization and
Stock Returns, Stanford Global Project Center (Aug. 21, 2017); Timo Busch, The Robustness of the
Corporate Social and Financial Performance Relation: A Second-Order Meta-Analysis, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Environmental Management (March 30, 2018); Camille Smith, et al., ESG Factors and
Risk-Adjusted Performance: A New Quantitative Model, Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment
(June 13, 2016); Ikram Radhouane, et al., The Impact of Corporate Environmental Reporting on CustomerRelated Performance and Market Value, Management Decision (July 9, 2018).
43

E.g., Jun Xie, Wataru Nozawa, et al., Do Environmental, Social, and Governance Activities Improve
Corporate Financial Performance? Business Strategy and the Environment (Aug. 14, 2018) (finding that
most ESG activities have a “nonnegative relationship” with corporate financial performance); Lars Kaiser,
ESG Integration: Value, Growth and Momentum, Journal of Asset Management (Jan. 25, 2020) (finding
that integrating ESG into traditional investment strategies does not burden risk-adjusted performance).

44

45

E.g., Scientific Beta, “Honey, I Shrunk the ESG Alpha”: Risk-Adjusting ESG Portfolio Returns (April
2021); Samuel Hartzmark & Abigail Sussman, Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment
Examining Ranking and Fund Flows, Journal of Finance; Aneesh Raghunandan & Shivaram Rajgopal, Do
ESG
Funds
Make
Stakeholder-Friendly
Investments?
(November
19,
2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3826357; Rajna Gibson Brandon et al., Do Responsible Investors Invest
Responsibly? https://ecgi.global/working-paper/do-responsible-investors-invest-responsibly.
E.g., Akane Otani, Big Technology Stocks Dominate ESG Funds, Wall Street Journal (Feb. 11, 2020);
Camila Hodgson, Funds Branded “ESG” Are Laden with Technology Stocks, Financial Times (Aug. 14,
2020).

46

47

See Bradford Cornell & Aswath Damodaran, Valuing ESG: Doing Good or Sounding Good? (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3557432.
12

District of Columbia Circuit recently struck down an SEC rule designed to experiment with stock
market bid-ask spreads.48
Moreover, any claim of causation would also necessarily imply suboptimality. That is, if
such causation is asserted, then the Proposal is also asserting that managers are either unaware of
this causation or are not maximizing shareholder value. Either way, the SEC is implying that it
knows better how to run a firm than the firm’s managers do.
II. Authority of Others and the “Public Interest”
In theory, the SEC could claim authority to promulgate the Proposal under the “public
interest” prong of its statutory power. Weak as the grounding in investor protection is, however, a
public interest rationale is even more problematic.
A. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Statutory Jurisdiction
Climate change is perhaps the most important public policy question of our time, as the
SEC’s leadership’s own repeated assertions attest.49 Commissioners and other officials have
repeated in speeches and other forums that climate poses enormous economic and political
consequences. Congress is aware of these and has long been active on the topic.50
The Clean Air Act of 1974 expressly delegates climate disclosure regulation, particularly
greenhouse gas emissions, to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA exercises
that authority through its Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, which currently measures and
reports on almost all such emissions in the United States from all sources. A general principle of
federal law holds that more recent and specific laws addressing a subject matter supersede earlier
and more general laws on that subject.
Accordingly, the EPA’s empowerment over this topic probably preempts any statutory
authority the SEC might claim. For another apt analogy, the SEC should consider the landmark
Supreme Court ruling that the ERISA statute, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor,
negates the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws and SEC’s regulation.51
Concerning major questions such as climate change, moreover, federal law also recognizes
that Congress can be expected to speak explicitly, thereby narrowing the scope for inferences of
authority such as the SEC necessarily relies upon. Indeed, this was the rationale for the Supreme
Court’s recent repudiation of an agency rule imposing national COVID vaccination
requirements.52 Congress had not clearly authorized the agency to do so as is expected concerning
matters of “vast economic and political significance.” The SEC should likewise take heed of such
Supreme Court guidance.
48

New York Stock Exchange v. SEC, No. 19-1042 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

49

See Joseph P. Grundfest, The SEC is Heading Toward a Climate Train Wreck, Bloomberg (April 5,
2022).

As an indicator of that awareness, as well as a measure of the highly political nature of the Proposal, it
prompted letters from 19 Senators and 40 House Members challenging the SEC’s power and urging it to
withdraw the Proposal.

50
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (19789).

52

See National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, 595 U.S. ____ (2022).
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B. State Corporate Law Prerogatives on Purposes, Powers and Business Judgments
Many advocacy groups the SEC cites for action make it clear that their passion on climate
change leads them to want significant changes in behavior.53 Many champions of ESG generally
are equally clear in their passion that corporations should not prioritize shareholder interests but
treat all stakeholders equally.54 The Proposal provides a mechanism for implementing those
advocacy groups’ desired outcomes that they have not been able to accomplish through legislative
changes.
The Proposal, a radical departure from current law, would require companies to disclose
extensive climate-related risks that have little to do with firms’ current financial outlook but serve
an ulterior political purpose.55 For instance, the Proposal prescribes a wide range of detailed
disclosure requirements. These start with emissions and extend to a company’s governance,
strategy, business model and outlook, risk management targets and goals and climate-related
financial statement metrics. All such matters, while far afield from the information shareholders
need for investment decision making, are extremely useful for advocacy groups’ aims at
influencing the behavior of corporations in which they have little, if any, economic stake.
But the SEC’s mission does not include adopting positions intended to promote particular
conceptions of acceptable corporate behavior. By law and tradition, that is the province of state
corporation law, not federal securities law.56 While a minority of critics have long sought to
federalize corporate law by preempting state law, they have failed.57 Those laws repose the power
and duty to formulate corporate strategy in the board, not shareholders, and make boards
accountable to shareholders above all other stakeholders. Courts defer to the business judgements
that a board makes, including on matters of climate and their relationship to business.
The Proposal would appear to be informed by a different vision, one in which a subset of
shareholders dictate corporate policy, corporate mission is geared to all stakeholders not primarily
shareholders, and boards no longer enjoy deference to their business judgment. But the SEC has
generally respected these longstanding boundaries and has been repudiated when it failed to do
so.58

53

See Appendix hereto.

54

See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure,
37 Yale Journal on Regulation 499, 532 (2020): (“[t]he goal, in short, is to make sustainability information
relevant to financial performance, even if it is not currently, by empowering noninvestor groups to pressure
corporations into improving their behavior” and that, “[f]ar from pursuing investor wealth, much of the
sustainability movement is designed to make corporate profits difficult to achieve unless management
attends to the needs of noninvestor stakeholders”).

55

See Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking Sustainability Mainstream,
56 American Business Law Journal 645, 669 (2019).

56

E.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).

57

See Roberto Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993).

58

Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (dual class capital structures).
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Some portray the Proposal as purely a matter of disclosure, which is the standard guardrail
delineating the boundary between federal securities law and state corporation law. But many
consider such a portrait as disingenuous. At a minimum, the Proposal’s scope, novelty, and highly
politicized subject matter warrants far greater attention to this question than the SEC has given it.
C. Risk of Unconstitutional Compelled Political Speech
Governments in the United States may compel the disclosure of a wide variety of
information but the government may make no law “abridging the freedom of speech,” as the First
Amendment puts it. Long-settled precedent forbids regulatory agencies such as the SEC to compel
citizens, including officers and directors and corporate entities, from expressing particular views,
whether on politically charged topics such as climate change or otherwise.59
Climate change is a politically-charged issue. The Proposal would compel corporations and
officials to regularly speak on these issues, explaining the views and opinions of their boards and
officers. As the Supreme Court made clear in prohibiting compelled speech as long ago as 1943:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.60
The compelled speech prohibition has been repeatedly reaffirmed by numerous federal
courts in the context of SEC rulemaking. A prominent recent example rebuked Congress, and the
SEC, for its attempted compulsion of political speech on the topic of “conflict minerals.”61
Responding to the passions of a subset of investors demanding this information is not a
sufficient government interest that might warrant such compulsion. Prudence alone counsels
caution against the intrusive and prescriptive rules in the Proposal.
III. Other Statutory Considerations
Beyond investor protection and public interest, amendments to the securities law statutes in the
late 1990s instructed the SEC to report on whether a proposed regulation will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.62 As suggested by the previous arguments, the Proposal would
retard these objectives, as the following brief additional points affirm.
A. Certain High Costs versus Highly Speculative Benefits
Climate change is a global issue not just in the political sense, but, more importantly, in
the physical geographical sense. The Proposal, if implemented, would require greater disclosure,
and likely greater focus on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by SEC registrants, mostly U.S.
59

Sean J. Griffith, What’s “Controversial” About ESG? A Theory of Compelled Commercial Speech under
the First Amendment (forthcoming 2022).
60

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

61

National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

62

Securities Act §2(b); Exchange Act § 23(a)(2).
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listed companies. During the last two decades, greenhouse gas emissions have decreased in the
U.S., whereas these emissions have more than tripled in China.63
China is the largest emitter in the world of greenhouse gas, emitting more than 30% of the
world emissions. The U.S. emits less than 15% of the world emissions. The Proposal does not
appear calculated to have any meaningful impact on China’s emissions. Without a meaningful
impact on China’s greenhouse gas emissions, the Proposal, even if implemented, will not have a
meaningful impact on climate change.
The Proposal makes it clear that it would certainly impose substantial compliance costs on
companies, approaching $1 million per year apiece. But the SEC rightly recognizes that it cannot
be sure of what benefits, if any, the Proposal will produce. The Proposal refers repeatedly to
benefits that “could,” “may” or “might” arise.
Institutional investors may be able to afford such an uncertain cost-benefit analysis. But
individual investors have the right to know whether the effort is worthwhile. Indeed, as the
Proposal expressly acknowledges, the focus of large index funds is on the average market return,
not on the profitability of particular companies.
While individual investors would care a great deal about how much a company paid in
relation to the gain, institutional index investors might care little. In its next attempt to address
this topic, the SEC should differentiate between the interests of powerful institutional investors
and everyday American investors and delineate the different costs and benefits for each.
The SEC should also compare the purported gains to individual investors to the likely gains
for other interested groups, especially the legal profession. The SEC recognizes that a major cost
of the Proposal concerns litigation risk. But it suggests that costly lawsuits would be the result only
for companies who fail to comply.
In fact, however, detailed prescriptive disclosure rules like those proposed are magnets for
lawsuits, including those that are frivolous or borderline. Such suits can cost tens of millions of
dollars each and produce scant or no benefits for either particular companies or society. The SEC
should both acknowledge and explain these trades-off candidly and clearly.
It is difficult to predict how a court would assess the validity of the SEC’s cost-benefit
analysis in the Proposal. But there is ample precedent of courts abrogating SEC rules for failure to
conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis.64
Litigation risk is amplified by the inherent uncertainty embedded in what the SEC is asking
companies to disclose. For example, if a company fails to anticipate or disclose a risk of a climate
related extreme natural disaster—such as a fire or flood—will the company face lawsuits for the
board’s failing to anticipate such a risk? The Proposals extensive and prescriptive disclosures pose
grave risks for issuers and investors alike.
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https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world

64

Business Roundtable v. SEC (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating proxy access rule as arbitrary and capricious for
lack of adequate cost-benefit analysis).
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B. Unduly Benefiting ESG Investors Impairs Investment Industry Competition
The Proposal will unevenly benefit a vocal cohort of institutional investors whose business
model is uniquely suited to gain from the disclosure regime proposed. These are mainly managers
of funds that promote an orientation toward non-economic values, particularly climate
consciousness. Other investors will share in bearing the cost of the Proposal, despite otherwise
gaining no benefit themselves and, in the case of institutions serving investment clients, despite
ceding competitive advantages to those rivals. The Proposal therefore functions as a means of
inhibiting competition.
C. Compliance Burdens Discourage Public Company Registrations
Given its high costs and intrusive nature, the Proposal will continue to drive some
companies into private equity rather than public markets. That impairs capital formation through
public markets, contrary to the SEC’s longstanding mission and value.
*****
Conclusion
We respectfully urge the SEC to withdraw the Proposal. We are concerned that the
passions of this topic have led the SEC to overzealous rulemaking that exceeds its statutory
authority. Governments, above all, must adhere to the rule of law, perhaps especially when
officials believe honestly and passionately in a specific agenda. The federal securities laws focus
on investor protection generally, while the Proposal prioritizes the demands of a subset of
America’s investment industry. We encourage the SEC to focus on all American investors, not
just the most vocal institutional and activist voices.
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Appendix: Analysis of the Proposal’s Citation Patterns
The Proposal’s citations skew heavily toward organizations that are prominent
environmental activists rather than prominent investors. For instance, the following are the five
organizations the Proposal invokes most frequently as authorities and which enjoy the greatest
number of unique citations in the Proposal:
MOST CITED OVERALL
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible EconomieS (Ceres)
Natural Resources Defense Council
Carbon Disclosure Project
UN Principles for Responsible Investment Corp. (PRI)
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)

Unique
Citations
17
16
15
14
13

Total
Mentions
23
22
28
22
40

Of the 28 organizations the Proposal invokes at least six times and which enjoy at least six
unique citations in the Proposal, 15 are prominent advocacy groups. Besides the foregoing, these
include Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Partnership for Carbon Accounting
Financials (PCAF), Regenerative Crisis Response Committee, Amazon Watch: Protecting the
Rain Forest, Carbon Tracker Initiative, and Friends of the Earth.
The ten investors (including asset managers or pension funds) the Proposal mentions most
frequently and which enjoy the greatest number of unique citations likewise skew toward those
that present themselves as outspoken proponents of social and political objectives:
MOST CITED INVESTORS

Unique
Citations
12
10
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
6

New York State Comptroller
BlackRock
Baillie Gifford
Hermes Equity Ownership Services
Trillium: Socially Responsible Investing
BNP Paribas
Northwest & Ethical Investments (NEI)
State Street Global Advisors
Wellington Management Co.
Norges Bank

20

Total
Mentions
14
18
9
8
9
12
8
8
8
6

